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Boehm: Aid and Politics in Uganda

The United States' Senate has just passed legislation calling for President
Barack Obama to develop a more comprehensive plan of action that will address
the ongoing violence in Northern Uganda. While the authors of the Lord’s
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2010 may
have good intentions, the push for America to play a more decisive role in the
conflict has come two decades too late and at a time when the rebel group, the
LRA, has left the country. While the violence has largely subsided in the North,
the conflict is not yet over. The rebel group continues to massacre communities in
the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Until
recently, a vague and noncommittal foreign policy, support for a semiauthoritarian regime, and generous donations of aid have characterized the United
States’ reactions to the atrocities committed in the Acholi sub-region of Uganda.
This violence erupted in the country’s Northern districts almost immediately after
President Museveni took power in 1986. The LRA leader, Joseph Kony, has since
terrorized Acholi communities in the name of liberating them from Museveni’s
dictatorship. Most famously, he has abducted an estimated 30,000 children to use
as sex slaves and soldiers, forcing them to torture and kill their relatives and
fellow children.1 Kony has also orchestrated several massacres, in which his army
hacked and clubbed to death hundreds of victims. This conflict has quickly
escalated into a “severe humanitarian crisis, with thousands killed, hundreds of
thousands of civilians injured, and between 1-2 million internally displaced, while
famine and illness” have ravaged the population.2 Despite the severity of the
situation, both the American and Ugandan government have largely failed to
bring the conflict to an end. Instead of taking action, the United States has chosen
to condone Museveni's undemocratic and corrupt policies by giving his regime a
substantial amount of aid and military assistance with no strings attached. While
this support has and continues to make a significant difference in many Ugandans'
lives, US foreign assistance has also played a complicated role during and after
the conflict. At the international, national, and local level, aid and the politics that
envelop aid have perpetuated the conflict and have created an environment
conducive to violence rather than improve the living standards of Northern
Ugandans. Articles from Ugandan newspapers and interviews with participants
confirm this theory.
Theoretical Background
Many scholars, including, most prominently, Jeffery Sachs, champion
foreign aid, arguing that it has an enormous potential to end cycles of poverty,
1

Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s Resistance
Army in Northern Uganda,” African Affairs 98 (1999): 25-26.
2
Aili Mari Tripp, "The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case of Uganda,"
Africa Today 50, no. 3 (2004): 22.
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catalyze economic development, cultivate civil society, and establish democratic
political and social norms. For Sachs and others, foreign aid represents "an
international transfer of resources that would not have taken place as the result of
market forces," which "includes grants and loans made at subsidized interest
rates, provided by governments or by international financial institutions" as well
as "technical assistance and debt relief."3 Seen from this perspective, the
underlying logic of aid lies in its capacity to provide a disadvantaged nation with
the most basic capital necessary for its development. Sachs points to a small
village in Kenya, Sauri, as a positive example of the effects of foreign
investments in agricultural methods, health, education, and infrastructure. He
asserts that "with fertilizers, improved fallows, green manures and cover crops,
water harvesting and small-scale irrigation, and improved seeds, Sauri's farmers
could triple the food yields per hectare and quickly end chronic hunger," and
improved "storage facilities would allow the village to sell the grain over the
course of months, rather than all at once, thereby getting more favorable prices."4
Development of stronger educational systems and vocational training programs,
he adds, would create a new generation of empowered students with the skills
necessary to develop local leadership and solutions to community problems. By
strengthening these human resources, "foreign aid could conceivably have
additional unintended benefits for democracy," because "better educated and
healthier people, in turn, may make better informed and more active citizens, who
are the lifeblood for democratic institutions."5 Yet the United States’ aid to
Uganda has not generated such benefits, chiefly because the American
government has failed to attach conditions that would both address realities on the
ground and encourage economic liberalization and democracy. In Uganda, US aid
has ultimately created more problems than it has addressed.
Rather than facilitate development in Uganda, US aid has instead
legitimized and propped up a government that relies on undemocratic practices to
maintain power. As it has in other nations, America could have used its aid as
leverage to compel Museveni to democratize and adopt a multi-party system of
government. Such assistance programs could, for instance, ensure that
"responsibilities of African governments are carried out competently as well as
conducted in a transparent and accountable manner," which would "make it more
difficult for state elites to make public policy decisions to the advantage of
3

Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Donors, Dictators, and Democrats in Africa," The Journal of Modern
African Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 412.
4
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin
Books, 2005), 233.
5
Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa," International Organization 55, no.
1 (2001): 137.
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individuals and groups supporting the government in power."6 Employed in this
fashion, US aid has the potential to trigger reforms to open Uganda's closed
political system. Yet American presidents have instead demonstrated both a
willingness to condone Museveni's actions and to reward his resistance to
democratization with funding. In 1993, for instance, the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) gave Uganda $25 million to increase and
diversify agricultural exports, and in 1994 America gave an additional $8 million
to support the Uganda Primary Education Reform Program.7 With these aid
packages, Museveni has been able to portray himself as an effective leader who
has worked to improve the Ugandan economy and its national educational system.
Without this assistance to mask his incompetence, Museveni may very well have
lost support from his constituents, who may have been more willing to overthrow
him and install a more capable leader. In this East African nation, then, US
foreign aid has ultimately consolidated Museveni's political dominance, and has
done little or nothing to foster democracy and democratic institutions.8 Indeed,
this support has given the Ugandan President a “security complex” by which he
feels that he can ignore internal pressures to create a larger space for opposition,
and this has created "conditions in which conflicts in the region can only thrive."9
Aid from the United States and other Western donors has, moreover,
perpetuated the LRA conflict by supporting a regime that has greatly limited the
extent to which political opposition leaders can peacefully and democratically
express their views. Instead, many opposition groups, particularly those in the
North, have resorted to violence. The Ugandan political system reflects a long
history of patronage politics, whereby officials use state resources to gain more
clients, who in turn support and, more specifically, re-elect, their patron. Such
practices are rooted in colonial legacies, which also "effectively created a
socioeconomic division between the North and South that consequently led to an
economic marginalization of the North and a further development of the South."10
Thus, politicians in power distribute rewards based on regional and tribal
affiliations, while the political opposition from other districts, namely the North,
are left with nothing. Since Museveni took power, "the alienation of political
forces in Uganda has become more extreme and accusations that the [National
Resistance Movement] NRM government is mainly for the people from President
6

Roger Tangri and Andrew M. Mwenda, "Patronage Politics, Donor Reform, and Regime
Consolidation in Uganda," African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 450.
7
Thomas P Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 130.
8
Tangri and Mwenda, "Patronage Politics," 453.
9
J. Oloka Onyango, "'New Breed' Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes
Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda's Yoweri Kaguta Museveni," Africa
Today 50, no. 3 (2004): 46.
10
Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message," 8.
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Museveni's region are more common," and this "growing alienation of political
forces [has] led to more rebel groups and violence in Uganda."11
In the more specific and practical realm of Uganda’s political system,
Museveni’s failure to establish free and fair elections during most of the conflict
further marginalized Northern rebel groups. Until recently, the Ugandan President
had banned political parties and effectively created a one-party state. The 2002
Freedom in the World report found that Ugandans did not have the ability to elect
their own leaders through democratic competition, because the government had
rigged past elections. The document also cited a 1999 Human Rights Watch
report, which "concluded that 'the NRM has consolidated its monopoly on
political power through exclusive access to state funding and machinery,
widespread and sometimes compulsory political education programs,'" and by
appointing the electoral commission.12 Given this legacy, those politicians who do
represent an opposition and who challenge the status quo have perennially faced
arrest and physical harassment. With no forum to voice opposition, many from the
North, including voices associated with the LRA, have responded to their
marginalization with violence.
US aid may have also undermined any incentives Museveni might have
contemplated for bringing an end to the conflict in the North. Instead, Uganda’s
widespread high-level government corruption suggests that Museveni and his top
officials have likely embezzled a portion of the aid packages given to Uganda
with the intention of helping him suppress violence. As such, aid may have
actually motivated the President to neglect the conflict-ridden North. The 2000
Transparency International Corruption Percentage Index ranked Uganda in the
bottom ten countries.13 In this East African country, corruption has long
characterized the politics in Kampala, and many top officials have used their
power and position for personal gain. "By enabling individual power-holders to
divert political resources into their own hands," the top "political leadership has
been able to retain their loyalty and keep them within the ruling coalition" and,
simultaneously, "individual government ministers as well as senior bureaucrats
and military officers have channeled part of their corruptly obtained monies to
ensure that the government remains in power."14 Yet when Museveni came to
power, he promised to end corruption, and while he has established “certain
11

Ellen Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s: What Impact on
Democratization?" The Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 4 (1999): 636.
12
Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Uganda. 2002. <http://www.freedomhouse.org>
13
Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. 2000. <http:www.transparancy.org>
14
Roger Tangri and Andrew M. Mwenda, "Politics, Donors, and the Ineffectiveness of AntiCorruption Institutions in Uganda," Journal of Modern Africa Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 104.
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legislative measures in place to combat corruption,” the “resources to enforce
them are lacking."15 For instance, the 1995 Constitution established the
Inspectorate of Government (IG) to prevent and punish corruption, but the IG
head has always been a member of the NRM. It has rarely investigated cases that
involve high-level party members.16 Foreign aid has ultimately fuelled this cycle
of corruption by expanding the capital available to these officials. In the 1990s,
during the conflict, some scholars argue that aid-related corruption was so
widespread that local primary schools received only 20 cents of every US aid
dollar.17 Yet, America has continued to give assistance “to help Museveni fight
the LRA”, and so long as the aid keeps coming, it remains unlikely that top
politicians will push to end the violence in the North and stabilize the region.
Additionally, aid has encouraged Museveni to ignore a conflict that has
affected only those in his political opposition, and thereby eliminating them as a
viable threat. The British colonizers only crystallized pre-existing divisions
between the North and South, and more specifically between the Baganda and
Acholi. By giving privileges to the South and by neglecting the North, the British
established a political system of inequality. As a result, in its post-independence
history, Uganda has experienced persistent and recurring ethnically- and
regionally-motivated violence. For instance, Idi Amin's "brutality and buffoonery
made world headlines as hundreds of thousands of people were killed," and
Milton Obote tortured and murdered 250,000 people at the beginning of his
second regime.18 Museveni's politics have only differed from his predecessors in
that he targets the North for political oppression. Many Acholi, for instance,
believe that "Museveni created the [Internally Displaced Person] camps to
neutralize them as a source of political opposition."19 He has prolonged the
conflict, they argue, so that he can justify spending on his political base--the
army. Northerners have often asked: "'How can the President support the SPLA,
the RPF and the Kabila and still pretend that he is lacking the means to protect the
Acholi from the LRA?'"20 Without US assistance, the situation would have been
different. Foreign aid has funded the IDP camps, food relief, and medical care.
With the camps paid for, his political base satisfied, and his opposition
successfully quieted and marginalized, what motivation does Museveni have to
bring an end to the conflict?
15

Freedom House. Freedom in the World: Uganda, 2009. <http://www.freedomhouse.org>
Tangri and Mwenda, "Patronage Politics," 461.
17
Dambisa Moyo. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working And How There Is A Better Way For Africa
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 53.
18
Freedom House. Freedom in the World: Uganda, 2002.
19
Matthew Green, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt For Africa's Most Wanted, (Northampton:
Olive Branch Press, 2009), 118-119.
20
Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message," 32.
16
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After two decades of conflict, the situation of underdevelopment in local
communities has remained unchanged, chiefly because people do not hold
Museveni's government accountable for its failures to end the conflict and to
provide services. Aid has undermined this accountability. From the beginning of
the conflict in 1986 to 2007, Uganda received a total of roughly $17.4 billion in
aid, which represented over half of the nation's annual budget.21 Dependence on
American and other nations’ assistance "structures accountability as something
between the executive branch of government and aid donors rather than between
state and society," and this accountability between the state and civil society is a
fundamental component of a democracy.22 The absence of a more democratic
relationship occurs because foreign aid is an "unearned" source of income; the
revenue does not come from taxes but from donors. "At no time," then, do
African states "establish a major tradition of providing goods and services in
exchange for taxes and fees," and so "foreign aid stymies the very values of
responsive and efficient government it is meant to foster."23 In the North, Acholi
communities—communities affected most by the conflict--have failed to hold the
appropriate actor accountable: Museveni's government. Instead, these people have
often looked to NGOs and the aid agencies of foreign donors rather than the
President to end the conflict. With no one holding him accountable, Museveni
risks little political capital in perpetuating the conflict. Yet why has the United
States, which claims to expand "democracy and free markets, while improving the
lives of citizens in the developing world," continued to fund such an undemocratic
regime?24
America's need to justify its economic and political donor stipulations—
more so than its desire to maximize the potential benefits of aid--has shaped its
aid policy to Uganda. The West has poured billions of dollars into African
nations' development since their independence but, after decades of failures,
various observers began to question the capacity of foreign aid to address these
countries' problems. During these unsuccessful years, many scholars began to
criticize the United States for forcing economic reforms on Africa. Their main
arguments "were that these programs did not work and that donors imposed
dangerous and useless goals on weak countries" that might, in the long term,
undermine their development.25 Instead of helping Africa industrialize, the
21

UN Data: A World of Information. Official Development Assistance and Official Aid (Uganda).
2009.
22
Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in SubSaharan Africa,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (2004): 265.
23
Goldsmith, "Foreign Aid and Statehood," 127.
24
USAID. This is USAID. 2009. <http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/>
25
Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors," 633-34.
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economic reform efforts attached to aid, scholars argued, have centered on
“resurrecting the primary-product export economies that existed at the time of
independence.” 26 Such reforms have clearly benefited American businesses,
which have continued to rely on Africa for cheap prices of raw materials. US
corporations can manufacture products and sell the secondary goods back to the
developing countries for higher margins of profit. To justify the implementation
of these economically-beneficial programs, the United States desperately needed
to find a success story. Then, donors could claim that aid failures were a result of
uncooperative recipient governments rather than the economic conditions that
they attached to aid. Uganda fit this Western definition of success. In just four
years, from 1991-1995, the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had grown
at an annual rate of 4-6 percent, and its per capita GDP growth averaged 3 percent
per year in real terms. And in from 1994-1995 alone, Uganda's GDP doubled its
expected rate of 5 percent.27 Following Uganda's adoption of free-market reforms
encompassing economic liberalization, privatization, and the reform of public
enterprise, Museveni earned accolades from many in the West."28 Former
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went as far as to hail Uganda as a "beacon
of hope."29 The United States, then, has little motivation to admit fault and alter
aid policies that benefit its economy in a way that would pressure Museveni to
end the conflict and establish democratic policies. America will continue giving
unstipulated aid to Uganda.
Beyond these economic motivations, the United States has had a vested
interest in maintaining Uganda as an ally in the War on Terror against its neighbor
and long-time enemy, Sudan. Because the Northern Sudanese government in
Khartoum had harbored Osama Bin Laden and other Islamic terrorist suspects,
America "categorized Sudan as a 'state sponsor of terror' and applied multilateral
sanctions" in 1993, and President Bill Clinton "authorized providing military
assistance to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda in order to contain" the Sudanese
threat.30 After September 11, 2010, the United States' focus on Sudan and its civil
war intensified as President George W. Bush fixated on eradicating terrorism. The
Islamic government's ties with radical Arab movements in the Middle East further
motivated Bush to take a keen interest in the region.31 Yet due to past experiences
26

John Haberson and Donald Rothchild, eds. Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order
(Boulder: West View Press, 2009), 43.
27
Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors," 633.
28
Oloka Onyango, "'New Breed' Leadership," 46.
29
Anne Mugisha, "Change in Uganda: Museveni's Machinations." Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2
(2004): 140.
30
Asteris Huliaras, "Evangelist, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration's Policy
towards Sudan," Orbis 50, no. 4 (2006): 710.
31
Greg Collins, "Incorporating Africa's Conflicts into the War on Terror," A Journal of Social
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in Somalia, the American government has since demonstrated a hesitancy to
directly intervene in the internal conflicts of African nations or in highly localized
conflicts between African states. The United States, then, had to devise a strategy
that allowed it to discretely fund the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA),
the rebel group fighting the Northern government. Because its conflict has been
closely connected to Sudan’s civil war, America looked to Uganda.
To pursue its geopolitical interests in the region, the United States has
relied on Uganda's past relationships with and policy toward Sudan. Uganda has
backed SPLA leader, John Garang, for decades and, in response, Khartoum has
funded the LRA. Specifically, Uganda has given the SPLA shelter in the North,
and the Islamic Sudanese government has provided the LRA with land mines,
anti-personal mines, and training facilities.32 Funding for the SPLA, however,
increased under Museveni's regime, "a fact that coincided with a more active
Western interest in fighting what is considered to be the scourge of Islamic
fundamentalism."33 Thus, the United States gives a significant amount of military
aid to Museveni, which he will then ship north to the SPLA under the guise of
sending vehicles and equipment to fight the LRA.34 The Ugandan conflict has
provided a sufficient justification for shipping military assistance to the North. To
maintain this relationship, America's must also placate Museveni by funding his
regime. This "lack of donor political conditionality on Uganda," has largely been
"due in part to the fact that donors, particularly the US and Great Britain, [have]
relied on President Museveni's leadership in the region for their foreign policy
goals."35 US foreign aid, donated to maintain Uganda's loyalty and support of the
SPLA, has ultimately propped up a corrupt government that perpetuates the LRA
conflict by forcing marginalized political opposition to resort to violence. This aid
has further prolonged the war by undermining the level to which Acholi
communities hold Museveni accountable for failing to bring an end to the
conflict.
Methods
Because most Northern Ugandans have benefited from foreign aid, I could
not simply ask them if that assistance had, in their view, perpetuated the conflict
and created an environment conducive to violence. Instead, I examined their
perceptions and the views conveyed in Ugandan newspapers of seven factors that
Justice 19 (2007): 398.
Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message," 25.
33
Oloka Onyango, "'New Breed' Leadership," 41.
34
John F. Clark, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and Foreign
Affairs Bureaucracies,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 26, no. 2 (1998): 10.
35
Hauser, "Ugandan Relations with Western Donors," 634.
32
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have contributed to such a volatile atmosphere and have motivated opposition to
respond with violence. These components or indicators include: the extent to
which aid has legitimized Museveni’s regime, the existence of a space for
political opposition, marginalization based on ethnicity and region, corruption,
NGOs and aid agencies, accountability, and the role of the US assistance in
Uganda’s political development and its Northern communities.
Participants:
A total of eleven individuals, consisting of four Gulu residents, four local
leaders, two national government officials, and one United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) representative, agreed to participate in the
study. Here, a leader can be defined as any individual that holds a prominent and
influential position within the community, which includes but is not limited to
political, social, religious, and intellectual figures. Only two of these six local and
national leaders are women, and two of the four Gulu residents are women. In
total, then, four women and seven men participated in the study. With the
exception of the USAID representative, all subjects are Ugandan citizens, and all
live in the North. The participants’ ages ranged from 22 to 57. Their
socioeconomic backgrounds also varied, but I interviewed neither impoverished
nor extremely wealthy Ugandans. All participants spoke fairly good English,
which generally indicates a high level of education relative to the rest of their
community.
The focus on Gulu residents and local leaders is appropriate, chiefly
because Northern Ugandan communities have previously responded to political
exclusion with violence. These leaders presumably speak for and represent their
communities, and would, thus, articulate opinions that have circulated among
their constituents. Indeed, local perceptions of these seven indicators have and
will continue to significantly affect the relationship that exists between foreign
aid, the LRA conflict, and Museveni’s government. For example, if foreign aid
has provided Museveni with the resources to maintain power and the Acholi
believe that his government excludes them, then members of these communities
may return to the bush to fight. Likewise, if communities persist in holding NGOs
and aid agencies accountable for building roads and schools, they will never
pressure Museveni to change, and he will continue to pursue undemocratic and
corrupt policies. The actors at this most basic level ultimately represent a political
force for change, and their perceptions can help explain why so much has
remained unchanged in the Acholi sub-regions of Uganda.
I also interviewed government officials working for Museveni and an
international aid representative to determine if their opinions regarding the
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indicators differed from local perceptions. These national-level actors generally
develop and implement government policies, while foreign donors devise aid
strategies that either condone or support recipient countries’ laws. In Uganda, the
existence of a “disconnect” between these actors’ and local communities’ views
may have helped prolong the conflict and contributed to an environment
conducive to violence. For instance, if the United States prioritizes its strategic
interests and condones Museveni’s corruption, American donor policy will remain
unchanged and continue to feed the violence. If government ministers believe that
Museveni has established a climate for political opposition, it is unlikely that they
would push for free and fair elections. And, if Gulu residents still feel excluded
from the political process, they may resort to violence. Thus, to fully understand
the complex relationship between foreign aid, Museveni’s government, and
conflict, I had to examine the dynamics between international, national, and local
actors.
Methods:
To collect qualitative data, I read Ugandan newspapers and conducted
semi-structured interviews in a location of the subjects’ choosing for
approximately one hour. The objective of this particular method centers on
understanding an individual’s opinions and feelings about a specific topic.
Because I wanted to study the complex relationship between public opinions,
foreign aid, conflict, and politics, the researcher expected that participants’ views
would be equally complicated and would often need clarification. Thus, I decided
to rely on a somewhat flexible data-collecting method. To conduct semistructured interviews, I prepared a general outline of questions, but I rarely
phrased questions the same way for each individual. Nevertheless, all questions
measured participants’ perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of foreign aid,
the role of the United States in Uganda, the level of corruption in Museveni’s
government, political marginalization, and accountability. I also frequently
stopped to ask follow-up questions, clarify a participant’s comment or to fully
discuss a topic raised by an individual’s answer.
Because I wanted to employ a flexible methodology that still minimized
researcher bias, I decided to employ neither structured interviews nor unstructured
(focus) interviews. Instead, I wanted to achieve a balance between the two
research approaches. Structured interviews and surveys emphasize standardization
and consistency as a means to eliminate researcher bias. Such methods ensure that
I could attribute the variability in my results to my independent variable rather
than to confounding variables. Had I adopted them for this project, their structures
would have precluded a subject’s stray comment or chance observation and my
own ability to discuss and explore such answers further. This method also would
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have limited the scope in which my participants could have discussed the topic,
and it would have prevented me from gaining a complete understanding of the
individuals’ views on the subject. While I did want the ability to deviate from a
pre-determined set of questions, I did not want to conduct a wholly unstructured
or focus interview. Researchers generally employ these more “spontaneous”
methods to discuss a series of events or experiences rather than a single topic and,
so, they do not prepare a set of questions to ask the participant. The interview
flows more like a conversation. Yet this method often produces unfocused data
and researcher bias. I, however, sought to examine individuals’ opinions on the
specific but complex topic of foreign aid rather than a participants’ narrative, and
so I chose not to use such methodologies.
I also decided to conduct individual interviews rather than focus groups. I
anticipated that private conservations rather than more public discussions would
allow participants to discuss somewhat taboo subjects. Many of my target
participants are members of either the local government or national government
and, thus, some individuals may have found it difficult or awkward to answer
questions regarding corruption, free and fair elections, and marginalization to be
difficult. Also, several leaders may have wished to remain anonymous. Sharing
their opinions before a focus group would have jeopardized their confidentiality
and, probably, for some, their jobs. Moreover, a focus group would have greatly
hindered my ability to ask participants to clarify their answers, and explore a
single persons’ perception of the subject matter.
Limitations:
My experiences as a citizen of the developed world may have limited my
ability to approach this research objectively and, thus, gain a more holistic
understanding of the role that foreign aid has played in Northern Uganda. Because
I live in a country with clean water, accessible healthcare, a strong education
system, good roads, and other basic infrastructure, I cannot fully understand the
many challenges Ugandans face on a daily basis. I may, then, be too quick to
dismiss the benefits that foreign aid brings to these communities and too quick
focus on the long-term problems that this assistance has often created. I believe
that my inclination to criticize entrenched patterns of foreign aid stems from my
academic background in sociology and African politics, both of which tend to
challenge the status-quo theories of their disciplines. For example, because the
general public has often focused only on the benefits of aid, my professors have
generally emphasized the drawbacks of aid. Although these classes have
broadened my understanding of donor assistance, they may have also made me
prone to criticize. Such a predisposition may have influenced my research
practices. Despite my best efforts to use neutral phrases, I suspect that I
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occasionally asked leading questions that may have biased my results. My use of
semi-structured interviews, which allowed me to phrase questions differently,
rather than structured interviews and surveys, may have also increased the number
of such “loaded” questions.
Although all of my participants spoke English, I found it hard to fully
understand the accents, nuances, and verbal cadences in many of their responses,
and my requests for clarifications rarely resulted in speech that I clearly
understood. This language barrier probably prevented me from obtaining a
complete sense of their views on foreign aid. This obstacle combined with my
own habit of talking quickly, also may have limited participants’ ability to
comprehend my questions. Some individuals may have also felt embarrassed to
admit that they did not or could not understand my questions. Even without their
requests, I still felt that I had to repeat my requests and simplify my questions to
get a relevant response. As such, my data may not entirely and accurately reflect
my participants’ views.
Limited time, resources, and other circumstances further prevented me
from eliminating all confounding variables from my research and, so, the
variability in my data may reflect a broad range of unrelated factors. Specifically,
my small sample size limited my ability to control for participants’ ages, genders,
and education levels. I found it extremely difficult, for instance, to achieve an
equal gender ratio. Despite government initiatives, Uganda has yet to achieve
gender equality and, thus, I struggled to find female local and national leaders.
Because I did not control for these confounding variables, they may have biased
the participants’ perceptions. For instance, a national leader who studied abroad at
an American or European university may have a very different view on US aid
policies than one who attended Gulu University. This leader’s response, then,
would not reflect the general opinion of other national government officials. I
cannot, then, generalize my results to represent the sentiments of the rest of the
community.
Finally, I wanted to interview a USAID representative who could give me
a general overview of the organization’s policies and who could present an
opinion that would reflect those in Washington D.C., who ultimately make
policies. However, the participant I spoke with is clearly removed from this
process. Rather than give me a broad understanding of USAID’s rationale behind
its support of Museveni, his views and frustrations reflected those of the local
community leaders. For instance, he told me that he did not want to be associated
with the politics behind US foreign aid implementation strategies, and that he
regretted that USAID was at the center of that process. Thus, I feel that I did not
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necessarily obtain an accurate perception of those who actually make and
implement policy. This may have limited my capacity to fully address the
dynamics between local, national, and international actors.
Findings
In theory, foreign aid has the potential to eradicate cultures of poverty,
establish democratic traditions, and develop successful economic systems. Yet
such objectives have not always translated into success on the ground. This has
been precisely the case in Uganda. In this East African nation, US assistance has
perpetuated the conflict and created an environment conducive to violence by
undermining government accountability and legitimizing Museveni’s regime. In
failing to allow political opponents to freely express their views and compete,
marginalizing its opposition, relying on corruption, and promoting a system of
regional patronage, Museveni’s government has left the North with few options
besides violence. Although American aid is certainly directed towards building
infrastructure, addressing poverty, and promoting democracy, it is fundamentally
given to benefit American economic and geopolitical interests. Consequently, the
United States does not employ its military assistance and aid programs as leverage
to pressure Museveni to adopt more democratic policies and, more specifically, to
improve the circumstances of war-torn Acholi communities. Thus, the findings of
this study serve two purposes: first, to either prove or disprove the proposed
theoretical argument that aid has legitimized Museveni’s regime and, has thus,
perpetuated the conflict and has created an environment conducive to violence
and, second, to determine if there is a “disconnect” between local communities’,
Museveni’s government officials’, and US aid workers’ perceptions of these
indicators. The study found that, with the exception of participants’ perceptions
regarding foreign aid’s benefits and America’s aid policies, the people
interviewed and the Ugandan newspapers largely confirmed the aforementioned
theory. Moreover, upon examining the extent to which Museveni has created a
space for political opposition and investigating the levels of corruption within topranking officials, the study found two significant disparities in perceptions
between national government officials and local communities.
Perceptions of Aid and Aid-Related Factors of Conflict in Northern Uganda
Although various scholars have argued that the difficulties US assistance
has created will ultimately outweigh the benefits that it has generated, participants
generally spoke of the real advantages foreign aid had conferred on their
communities. Specifically, when asked if aid had created any problems, all Gulu
residents said that the assistance had, instead, brought their communities only
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benefits.36 Robert Omony, for instance, emphasized numerous positive effects of
aid. He told me that he and his community had “survived the war because of
NGOs,” because “they provided food and money for peace talks, and [because]
they helped a lot with the region’s HIV/AIDS problem.”37 While they did
demonstrate a more vigorous inclination to criticize foreign aid, leaders at all
levels also acknowledged both its positive effects and the gratitude that their
communities had for donors. Samuel Otim, a Gulu District Officer, said that “aid
has helped alleviate our poverty and [has improved] our education system,”
because “NGOs have helped build schools and classrooms, provided teacher
accommodation, and provided desks and chairs.”38 Both international aid workers
and national government officials echoed such sentiments. USAID Deputy
Country Representative John Gattorn said that the Acholi “feel overwhelmingly
grateful and positive” for the aid.39 Psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs explains the tendency of the participants, specifically community members
and leaders, to focus on foreign aid’s benefits rather than its shortcomings. In his
1943 paper titled A Theory of Human Motivation, Maslow argues that people will
try to satisfy basic physiological needs before turning to safety, love and
belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs.40 To apply Maslow’s insights to
Uganda, then, people will first focus on obtaining food and water before they
secure political freedoms. Such motivations may have prevented Gulu residents
from acknowledging aid’s negative effects. In the eyes of community members,
what does it matter if aid facilitates corruption when they lack access to clean
drinking water?
While it was difficult to measure perceptions of the extent to which
foreign aid has legitimized Museveni’s regime in a region of the country that has
never supported his government, recent Ugandan newspapers articles reflect how
aid has provided Museveni with the resources to maintain power. For instance, an
article that appeared in an April 2010 issue of The East African, “U.S. Comes to
the Rescue of a Country’s Troubled Health Sector,” discusses the United States’
decision to fund the IntraHealth project, which seeks to provide access to
healthcare among the country’s rural poor. In total, America gave the Ministry of
Health $11 million to help “advance recruitment and retention rates for health
staff by setting up better payroll systems and [to] promote a healthy work
36
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environment.”41 The United States also recently gave Gulu district $1.3 million to
improve its education system by building 68 teacher’s houses, 40 classrooms, and
20 primary schools.42 In both instances, aid has enabled Museveni’s government
to provide services that it should have provided on its own and, thus, this aid has
legitimized his regime. Aid donors have “weakened the resolve of African states
to act on behalf of their citizens,” and development assistance “has had the
perverse and unintended political effect of reinforcing despotic rule.”43 As long as
America continues to give the economic assistance that Museveni needs to
provide basic services, it remains unlikely that the President will change corrupt
and undemocratic policies that have motivated political opposition to resort to
violence.
The perceptions of Gulu residents and three local leaders reinforced the
study’s proposed theory that Museveni had marginalized and largely excluded
their communities, which represent Museveni’s oppositional base, from the
political process. When asked if politicians could speak openly and compete in
free and fair elections, Evelyn Piranok, a dressmaker, responded that “politicians
can talk but they are not safe,” and that “elections are not good, because even if
we elect someone, Museveni will steal it [sic],” which is “why people are going
back to the bush to fight.”44 A community leader, Rosalba Oywa, echoed these
complaints. She said that elections had never been free and fair due to vote buying
and other irregularities. She added that “Ugandans live in great fear. They should
not be saying anything negative about the government, because they will be
wrongly framed if they do.”45 Appointed by Museveni, the former Chief Mediator
between the Ugandan Government and the LRA, Betty Bigombe, said that
“people have felt marginalized for years,” and that “was the reason for the war.”46
Newspaper stories confirm these attitudes about marginalization and the
suppression of political opposition. Just recently, the police arrested the leader of
the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) opposition party, Dr. Kizza Besigye.
During a presidential campaign rally, Besigye allegedly told his followers to
break the thumbs of NRM party members. Such comments, the police have
argued, could incite violence and are, thus, illegal.47 In response to his
41
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investigation regarding such accusations and other comments, according to
another story in The Monitor, “Besigye said ‘the collapsing NRM regime’ will
always intimidate and arrest people like him who have devoted their lives to
educating Ugandans about the wrongs of the system.”48 How can communities in
the North and other regions of the country feel included in the political system
after a history of one-party rule and when many of their leaders have been
wrongly arrested?
The findings of scholars and Transparency International are reflected in
participants’ perceptions of corruption in the Ugandan government. Specifically,
community members and their leaders emphasized the high levels of aid-related
corruption within Museveni’s government. When asked if the President was
pocketing the aid and enriching himself, Evelyn, a Gulu resident, responded, “Of
course Museveni is benefiting more than the people who are poor because he is a
corrupt man.”49 Similarly, Rosabla, a community leader, discussed the extent to
which government officials have embezzled funds intended for her community.
To these communities, corruption and government policy have become
synonymous terms. National government officials also acknowledged the
pervasiveness of corruption within their government, and John, the USAID
representative, said that “corruption is basically the system here.”50 Participants
may hold these opinions because, after years of promises, Museveni’s regime has
done little to combat corruption, and the government has yet to persecute a single
top-ranking official51 Instead, the Acholi people have seen aid donations increase
from $1.9 million in 1986 to $1.7 billion in 2007, but they have enjoyed little
improvement in their communities.52 They have watched their politicians in
Kampala grow wealthier while their incomes have remained stagnant. Such
experiences have led members of these communities to believe that Museveni has
personally benefited from military assistance and foreign aid. If this is indeed the
case, the President would have little motivation to end a conflict that has brought
and continues to bring significant donations of aid to Uganda.
Because it was difficult to ask participants if Museveni had intentionally
prolonged the conflict as a means to eliminate the North as a viable political
threat, the study, instead, explored participants’ perceptions of the politics of
regionalism as a foundation for the larger argument that Museveni had
48
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intentionally perpetuated the conflict. All participants at the local level believed
that the President supported other regions of the country, specifically the West, far
more than the North. For instance, Charles Okello, a driver in Gulu, said that
“Museveni favors other regions before the North, which is the least favored.”53
Dorothy Akot, a student, added that while Museveni does give to the North, he
does not give very much. She said that other parts of Uganda had much better
jobs, roads, and hospitals.54 Local leaders reiterated these sentiments. They said
that their communities largely believed that Museveni had neglected the North.
Ugandan newspaper articles expanded upon these feelings of exclusion and
addressed the broader argument that Museveni deliberately prolonged the conflict
as a means to further marginalize his political opposition. A recent news story
reported that Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) leader, Olara Otunnu, said that
“Museveni used the war to justify why he could not allow Ugandans to have a
genuine multiparty democracy or federal system,” and that “Museveni would say
that could wait because the government was preoccupied with finishing the
rebellion.”55 Such opinions stem from the colonial practice of divisionism. The
British exacerbated pre-existing regional tensions by favoring the South over the
North with regard to economic development and political rights.56 This division
became ingrained in Uganda’s post-colonial political culture and remains a
fundamental issue in contemporary Ugandan politics. Specifically, “regionalism
and ethnicity continue to be the usual means of determining who gets what in the
political and economic regions.”57 Hence, the Acholi recognize that they represent
Museveni’s political opposition, and they may feel that, in so far as Museveni is a
member of a tribe that has long opposed the North, he has largely ignored the
region’s troubles.
Upon examining the extent to which Northern communities hold NGOs
and foreign aid agencies accountable for government services, the study found a
complex trend. To some degree, participants do hold Museveni accountable for
his failure to provide resources and services. When asked who to blame for the
under-development in the North, most participants blamed the government.
However, if asked who they turn to first if they have a problem, all participants
said NGOs and aid agencies. A comment by a Gulu University student
characterized the responses of the majority of his fellow community members. He
said, “When people go to the government, it is not very fast and it takes a lot of
53
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time, but the NGOs are fast,” and, so, he added, “Why waste time going to the
government?”58 Rosalba, a community leader, also noted that NGOs and aid
agencies have completely replaced the government in the realm of effective
services and resources. The government, she indicated, is no longer responsible to
the people.59 Thus, a dissonance exists in the participants’ opinions: while people
blame Museveni and his government for his failures, they fail to hold his
government accountable. Instead, they tend to hold NGOs and aid agencies
accountable, by first asking these organizations, not their government, to build
schools, hospitals, and roads for their communities. Participants’ previous
experience with these organizations may have caused this pattern of responses.
The flow of capital into the North has been “little affected by government
efficiency,” and so “there is little incentive to improve state capacity.”60 Because
participants have relied on NGOs and aid agencies for economic support, they
will likely pressure these organizations to improve their capacity before they
pressure Museveni’s government.
Numerous scholars have examined the motivations behind America’s
generous aid donations, and many have pointed to the United States’ economic
and geopolitical interests in Uganda. However, such arguments carry little weight
on the ground in Gulu. Only two local leaders and the USAID representative
addressed America’s strategic use of foreign aid. When asked why the United
States gave such significant amounts of aid to her country, Rosalba responded,
“Because of Uganda’s position. It is situated next to Sudan, which the US
blacklisted because of its Islamist government,” and, as she pointed out, “support
to the SPLA from Uganda is actually from the US.”61 She added that America is
not ignorant of the problems aid has created in Uganda, but that the United States
turns a blind eye because of its own interests. John stated that, “As much as
[USAID workers] want to stay out of politics, the truth is that we are at the center
of it.”62 The remaining participants all gave various explanations that touched on
Ugandans’ cooperation, Americans’ humanitarian nature, the conflict, and
Museveni’s policies. Evelyn, a dressmaker, for instance, said that Americans gave
generous aid donations to Uganda, “because they are good, and they think of us as
their people too. They care about us.”63 Maslow’s theory of human motivation
may again explain why Ugandans may not recognize this strategic function of
assistance. Only when their most immediate needs are satisfied, can these
58
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communities really explore the larger, more abstract issues tied to aid. Until then,
they may only understand aid’s benefits rather than its larger, geopolitical and
economic nature. Such motivations remain largely irrelevant to the majority of
these participants.
Disconnects Between Local, National, and International Perceptions
Because “disconnects” in perceptions may heighten the Acholi’s feelings
of marginalization and exclusion, the study examined the extent to which local,
national, and international actors’ views differed. The study found that, despite
expectations of identifying disparities between the goals of USAID endeavors and
local perceptions of these efforts, these two participant groups’ held similar
views. This lack of discrepancy may be attributed to the USAID representative’s
distance from official policy and policy makers in Washington, D.C. The data,
however, did indicate significant differences between national government
officials’ perceptions and local communities’ opinions regarding political
exclusionary practices and corruption. Discrepancies of opinions in these subjects,
combined with the already existing problems that aid has created, have arguably
exacerbated the situation in the North. If national leaders fail to listen to local
communities, these communities may feel that violence is the only means to
having their “voice” heard in Kampala.
The majority of community members and leaders expressed frustration
with the government’s policies of marginalization and conditions for political
opposition, but national-level officials stated nearly the opposite. All Gulu
residents emphasized both that elections were not free and fair and that political
opponents cannot speak openly. Robert, specifically, said that “a leader has never
been thrown out of power by a vote.”64 Local leaders’ statements largely reflect
these views. Samuel, the Gulu District official, said that a true democracy does
not exist in Uganda. Instead, he argued that people have feared and will continue
to fear the government. Only David Labeja, a news editor for a governmentfunded radio station, believed that members of the political opposition could
speak their mind as long as they did so within the boundaries of the law.65 Hired
by Museveni, the Regional District Commissioner, Walter Ochora, disagreed with
the majority of these local sentiments. He argued that Museveni did allow the
political opposition to express its views. However, he said that “the opposition
takes advantage of these freedoms,” and that “they abuse the freedom of
speech.”66 By altogether denying practices of political exclusion, this government
official’s statement only exemplifies Museveni’s policies of marginalization.
64

Omony, interview.
Robert Labeja, interview by Sophie Boehm, Independent Study Project, Gulu, Uganda, 2010.
66
Walter, Ochora, interview by Sophie Boehm, Independent Study Project, Gulu, Uganda, 2010.
65

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2011

19

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4

While national-level government officials did acknowledge corruption,
they denied that Museveni was corrupt. Betty, for instance, stated that corruption
is deeply ingrained within Uganda’s political system. But when asked if Museveni
was personally embezzling a portion of the aid donations, she responded,
“Museveni is not benefiting. I have met him many times, and he is discouraged
with the situation.”67 Walter held a similar opinion. He said that corruption was
pervasive, but that it was limited to the accounting officers and did not extend to
Museveni.68 Because Museveni appointed these participants, they may benefit
from corruption and, thus, may have been unwilling to accuse the President.
Local leaders, however, perceived corruption to be rampant. Martin Mapenduzi,
Gulu’s District Council Speaker, said that it is not just Museveni’s government
that is corrupt—the President, himself, he asserted, is corrupt.69 When I asked a
community member, Charles, if he thought that Museveni was corrupt, he replied
“I do not just think it. It is true.”70 These communities may become increasingly
frustrated with their national government officials’ refusal to acknowledge
corruption within high-ranking politicians, and such high levels of aggravation
produce an environment that is conducive to violence.
Conclusion
After two decades of devastating violence and billions of dollars in foreign
assistance, much in Northern Uganda has remained largely unchanged. The region
continues to face many significant challenges including poverty, corruption,
patronage politics, a lost generation of youth, an absence of basic infrastructure,
and an under-developed education system. Why, then, have these generous
donations failed to improve the standards of living in Acholi communities when
similar amounts of assistance have achieved successful results in other East
African nations? In Uganda, America’s strategic use of foreign aid
implementation policies has ultimately subverted aid’s capacity to benefit the
country’s northern regions. US assistance has prolonged the conflict and fostered
an environment conducive to violence by legitimizing Museveni’s government.
His regime has established policies of corruption and marginalization that have
left political opposition with few alternatives to violence. Moreover, by
undermining government accountability, NGOs and aid agencies have
restructured the relationship between the state, civil society and donors. Rather
than push the state for change, Acholi community members first approach NGOs
with their needs. Thus, these communities have directed their efforts towards the
67
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wrong actor, and they have yet to pressure Museveni to fully address the conflict
and its effects. Interviews with Gulu district members and leaders validate this
phenomenon. Their statements illustrate the prevalence of Museveni’s corrupt
policies of exclusion and of a lack of accountability. To fully address this
situation, change must occur from both the bottom and top. Community members
must begin to hold Museveni accountable for his failures. Yet for this
mobilization to occur, the United States must reconstruct its foreign aid strategies
to include stricter political conditions. Despite this recent bill, the Lord’s
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2010, and
Hillary Clinton’s promise to oversee the upcoming elections, it remains unlikely
that America will change its aid policies and risk losing a regional ally, especially
with the current situation in Somalia.
Recommendations
In response to the conflict in Northern Uganda, the United States has
given both military assistance and generous aid donations, but this aid has only
prolonged the violence. To break this cycle, the American government must first
alter its foreign policy from one that responds to conflict and underdevelopment
to one that prevents such problems from arising. The United States must realize
that while such strategies may require significant start-up costs, they will be more
cost-efficient in the long-term. For instance, if America focused on establishing
real democracy in Sudan rather than its own interests, the United States may not
have had to give such large amounts of military assistance to Uganda and the
SPLA to fight the government in Khartoum. Hence, had the United States tied aid
directly to promoting stability and democracy in Uganda and Sudan, the US
would not now, amidst its “War on Terror,” be in a position of appeasing
Museveni. The development of such a free and open political system, then, may
have prevented the LRA from organizing recruits by appealing to their sense of
exclusion. Moreover, donors should attach conditions to foreign aid that both
address the recipient country’s needs while calling for the government to
implement more democratic traditions. America, then, should not simply give
millions of dollars free of restrictions to Museveni. Instead, USAID and other US
aid agencies should develop implementation strategies that require Museveni to
adopt anti-corruption laws, make a space for political opposition, establish a
tradition of peaceful political turnover, create a merit-based rather than patronagebased recruitment system, and promote free and fair elections. Such measures
would successfully address and combat feelings of political exclusion that
ultimately motivate communities to respond with violence.
Because NGOs and aid agencies have undermined the extent to which
communities hold the government accountable, donor aid policies must also
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restructure the relationship between donors, the state, and civil society. In a
functioning democracy, the government answers to its citizens but, in Uganda, the
state answers to donors rather than to its civil society. These communities, in
turn, largely look to NGOs and aid agencies to provide services. Thus, the Acholi
have long held the wrong actor accountable—donors. As a result, they have done
little to pressure the government to end the conflict and its practices of
marginalization. To establish a healthy civil society and end this cycle—a key
component to democracy—America must create smarter aid policies. The USAID
Deputy Country Representative in Gulu suggested that his institution and other
donor organizations should work with the Ugandan government to establish a
more transparent system. In place, but ignored, he argued, is a potentially
functional approach: villages and parishes create development strategies that they
submit to higher levels of government until the plans reach the national level.71
Rather than subvert this strategy and undermine government capacity, NGOs and
aid agencies should adhere to this policy. Local communities, then, would have a
forum in which to express their concerns and contribute to the national plan.
When problems arise, these citizens can then blame the government rather than
aid agencies and NGOs.
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